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Quantum physics is surprising in many ways. One surprise is the threat to locality
implied by Bell’s Theorem. Another surprise is the capacity of quantum computation,
which poses a threat to the complexity-theoretic Church-Turing thesis. In both cases,
the surprise may be due to taking for granted a certain strict arrow-of-time assumption,
whose applicability may be limited to the classical domain. This possibility has been
noted repeatedly in the context of Bell’s Theorem. The argument concerning quantum
computation is described here. Further development of models which violate this strong
arrow-of-time assumption, replacing it by a weaker arrow, is called for.
A. Introduction
Physics faces unresolved difficulties with arrows of
time. This has been evident at least since the discussions
of Boltzmann’s H-Theorem and Loschmidt’s paradox in
the late 19th century. Although progress has been made
in connecting different arrows of time to the low-entropy
big-bang origin of the universe, the resulting understand-
ing is still incomplete [see, e.g., Schulman (1997)]. Nev-
ertheless, “the” arrow of time is often taken for granted,
and is familiar from the “Newtonian schema” of kinemat-
ics plus dynamics (Wharton, 2015): it is often assumed
that a physical system can always be described as having
a “state” (kinematics) which “evolves” (dynamics) from
the past to the future.
There are also some well-known exceptions—not all
physics models conform to the rules of this schema. For
example, in order to find the “state” of a system at
a certain time according to the stationary-action prin-
ciple, one must specify inputs—the values of the posi-
tion coordinates—at both its past and future boundaries.
This demonstrates the “Lagrangian schema,” which re-
quires an all-at-once or block-universe approach. By
looking beyond the standard schema, one is freed from
the limitations of conventional thinking, and is open to
novel possibilities. Seeking such freedom is especially rel-
evant when an impasse is encountered; this article sets
forth the claim that the surprising power of quantum
computing [i.e., its tension with the strong form of the
Church-Turing Thesis (Arora and Barak, 2009)] is just
the type of “paradox” which calls for abandoning the
standard arrow of time.
There already exist several lines of evidence that
quantum physics is at issue with the standard arrow
of time [see also Dirac (1938); Wheeler and Feynman
(1945, 1949) in the classical context]. Early examples in-
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clude discussions of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
“paradox” (Costa de Beauregard, 1953) and delayed-
choice experiments (Bohr, 1935; Wheeler, 1978); recent
examples include argumentation from time symmetry
(Leifer and Pusey, 2017) and the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph
(PBR) theorem (Pusey et al., 2012) [the latter enquires
whether the quantum state is ontic or epistemic, i.e.,
whether it describes reality or merely the information
one has regarding a system; see, e.g., Leifer (2014)]. The
strongest argument involves Bell’s Theorem [see, e.g.,
Price (1997)].
As typically understood, Bell’s theorem proves that
there is no hope for reformulating Quantum Mechanics
(QM) in terms of “hidden variables,” or parameters di-
rectly describing events in spacetime. But this relies on
accepting the standard arrow-of-time rule, which is taken
for granted by the “Local Causality” (a.k.a. “Einstein Lo-
cality”) assumption of Bell’s Theorem. Within such an
approach, QM typically describes the “state” of a many-
particle system as a ray in an abstract and exponentially
large Hilbert space, with typical applications involving
superpositions and complex probability amplitudes.
Considering an alternative schema opens up the possi-
bility of describing quantum entanglement in terms of
spacetime-based parameters with standard probability
rules (Almada et al., 2016; Argaman, 2010). The appar-
ently nonlocal connection between distant regions a and
b is achieved through intermediate “hidden” parameters
λ, situated far enough in the past that they could rea-
sonably serve as a classical common cause for events in a
and b. In defiance of the standard arrow-of-time rule, λ is
taken to depend on the inputs in a and b, which are thus
indirectly connected, through the overlap of their past
lightcones. The fact that the “hidden” λ (a microscopic
parameter) may depend on future inputs need not lead to
violations of Signal Causality, just like the collapse of the
wavefunction at b due to a measurement at a does not
lead to violations of Signal Locality in the standard dis-
cussion of Bell correlations. For this reason, this type of
2“retrocausality” cannot lead to paradoxical causal loops.
[Any attempt to “measure” λ so that its value will be
correlated with that of a macroscopic pointer would re-
sult in loss of the entanglement, as in a “which path”
detection in the context of two-slit interference; see, e.g.,
(Buks et al., 1998).]
So far, progress in developing a full reformula-
tion of QM along these lines has been slow [see
Wharton and Argaman (2019) for a recent review].
If too much freedom is allowed, one might obtain
models with backward-in-time signaling, and it has
been argued that preventing this requires fine tuning
(Wood and Spekkens, 2015). Although counterargu-
ments are available (Almada et al., 2016), it seems that
a physical principle, perhaps associated with the entropic
arrow of time, is needed. Such a principle could limit the
excess freedom resulting from removal of the standard
arrow-of-time condition, and lead to results which would
systematically conform to the Signal-Causality arrow-of-
time rule.
A closely-related issue has to do with the degree of
correlations allowed in classical, quantum, or general
non-local theories. In proving Bell’s Theorem, one typ-
ically derives the CHSH inequality — the fact that in
any locally causal mathematical model, a certain com-
bination of correlators cannot possess a value larger
than 2 (Clauser and Horne, 1974; Clauser et al., 1969).
In general, one can generate models where this combi-
nation achieves values up to 4 (Popescu and Rohrlich,
1994), but in QM its value is limited to 2
√
2 (Cirel’son,
1980). Again, it appears that a physical principle is in-
volved in limiting the exaggerated freedom of generic
models. In fact, research in this context has already
made significant strides, involving several suggested prin-
ciples (Linden et al., 2007; Navascus and Wunderlich,
2010; Paw lowski et al., 2009).
In the present work, it is suggested that the algorithmic
complexity achievable with quantum computation simi-
larly provides motivation for rejecting the standard arrow
of time.1 Furthermore, here too it appears that a phys-
ical principle remains to be identified, one that would
limit the freedom obtained with such a rejection. The
argument is based on the distinction between a Directed
Acyclic Graph (DAG) and a non-directed graph.
Describing natural laws in spacetime in terms of math-
ematical parameters, and discretizing spacetime into N
distinct events, leads to a DAG if the strong arrow of time
is maintained. Assuming that the laws are local, and that
the past is fixed and the future is not yet relevant, the
mathematical rules for each event are greatly simplified,
and the number of steps in a simulation of the physics is
1 Other approaches connecting the flow of time with quantum com-
putation can be found in Aaronson (2005) and Castagnoli et al.
(2019).
just the number of events, N . But it is not clear to begin
with that the arrow of time must be imposed [see, e.g.,
Wharton (2015)]. In particular, if there are stochastic
rules that determine only how the probabilities for each
event depend on events in its vicinity (in both space and
time), without imposed arrows, finding the overall dis-
tribution for N events may be a much more complicated
computational task, due to the requirement that all N
events “simultaneously” conform to the physical laws.
As an example, consider the task of finding the ground
state of a three- (or higher-)dimensional spin glass, which
is known to be an NP-complete problem (Bachas, 1984;
Barahona, 1982).
It is thus seen that if one assumes that Nature supplies
us with finite “machines” which operate according to lo-
cal rules subject to the strong arrow of time, all that can
be achieved algorithmically is similar to a standard algo-
rithm with N steps, taking N to appropriately represent
the finiteness and the resolution pertaining to these “ma-
chines.” However, if the “machines” provided by nature
are not subject to an arrow-of-time rule, the possibility
that they might be capable of performing exponentially
harder tasks appears to be open. Our best understanding
of quantum computing does not lead us to expect natural
“machines” to be able to solve NP-complete tasks. The
complexity class associated with quantum “machines” is
the BQP class, which is (to the best of our knowledge2)
much weaker (Nielsen and Chuang, 2000). Thus, again,
a physical principle which is weaker than the standard
arrow of time is required, one that would limit the achiev-
able complexity class from NP-complete to BQP (not to
P).
In the next two sections we will go through the above
argument in a little more detail, describing the connec-
tion between events in spacetime and algorithmic steps
in the presence (Section B) and in the absence (Section
C) of a strong arrow of time. A discussion section and
conclusions follow.
B. The strict arrow of time motivates the strong form of
the Church-Turing Thesis
Mathematical models of classical physics employ lo-
cal variables or parameters with a clear association of a
place and a time for each parameter. A typical example
is provided by the values of the classical electric field,
E(x, t). In order to connect this with algorithmic com-
plexity, it is appropriate to discretize spacetime, taking
a finite number N of events, (xn, tn), distributed reason-
ably uniformly, to provide a sufficiently detailed repre-
2 Strictly speaking, that BQP is weaker than NP but stronger than
P is not a proven fact, but a conjecture which is assumed here.
3sentation of a finite region of (Minkowski) spacetime, to
some desired accuracy.
Within a kinematics plus dynamics schema, the state
of the modelled system at time t would be represented
in this picture by the events m with times tm between
t − ∆t and t for an appropriate small ∆t, and the val-
ues of the model parameters µm associated with these
events. The model obeys Local Causality if the dynam-
ics specify a rule (which may be either deterministic or
probabilistic) for obtaining the value of the parameters
at the nth event from the parameters in its recent past
and its close vicinity, with spacelike separations avoided,
so that the relevant events are in the past relative to tn
in all frames. We will denote the set of indices of these
earlier and nearby events by r(n).
If an external input, such as an external force, acts at
the nth event, the value of the parameters at that event
will be affected, but the values at earlier times will not.
The parameters µn associated with the nth event thus
include inputs In and non-input parameters Qn (each
of these is in general a set of parameters, not limited to
scalars). In the deterministic case, the dynamical rule Fn
specifies the value of Qn as a function of In and the ear-
lier {µm}m∈r(n) (the rule Fn depends also on the space-
time locations of n and the ms, of course). For example,
a model discretizing Maxwell’s equations in this man-
ner would have Qn corresponding to the electromagnetic
fields, and In specifying the charge and current densities,
the relevant inputs in this case. (For stochastic models,
Fn determines the probability distribution of Qn.)
Assuming that the values of the parameters µn are
appropriately discretized as well, so that the modeling
of each of the N events is finite, this description makes
it obvious that the algorithmic complexity of a simula-
tion according to such a model is O(N). Conversely, the
modeled physics cannot provide results which are not ef-
ficiently achievable by an algorithm with O(N) steps.
That physical systems are (polynomially) equivalent to
algorithms in this sense is an expression of the strong
form of the Church-Turing thesis (Arora and Barak,
2009). Barring problems with the discretization scheme,
classical physics indeed operates in this manner. That
quantum physics is different is discussed in the next sec-
tions.
Note that we have here considered only the number
of steps in the algorithm, N . It is of course possible
for only M out of the N events to have external inputs,
such as initial conditions, with the other N −M events
having no inputs (or having the corresponding In set to
zero or null in some fashion). It is further possible to
have the number of physical parameters N exponentially
larger than the number of physical inputs M , but this
possibility is not of interest for the purposes of the present
discussion, which focuses on N itself.
It is natural to take the N spacetime events to be
nodes of a graph, with directed edges from the ms in
r(n) to n itself, representing the dynamical rules Fn.
The resulting DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph) represents
the discretized mathematical model, as well as the al-
gorithm which would carry out a simulation according
to the model.3 All the edges in the graph are directed
from the past to the future (that the graph is acyclic
corresponds to assuming a standard Minkowski geome-
try, with no closed time-like curves).
Note how central the standard arrow-of-time assump-
tion is to the logic leading to the Church-Turing Thesis (it
is not denied, of course, that there are additional neces-
sary assumptions, e.g., regarding discretization—for the
present purposes it suffices that the standard arrow of
time is one of the necessary assumptions). It is the as-
sumption that for each node n, the task of obtaining the
parameters Qn can be performed while taking all the pa-
rameters from the past, i.e., from r(n), to be fixed, and
ignoring all the parameters relating to the future, which
leads to the finiteness of this task. Performing this for N
nodes is then necessarily an O(N) task.
C. Models with no arrow of time
Removal of the above arrow-of-time restriction
would have dramatic consequences for the algorithmic-
complexity consideration. If a mathematical model is as-
sociated not with a DAG but with an undirected graph
of N nodes, its capacity for computation could be en-
tirely different. In fact, for a reasonable choice of the
replacement for the rules Fn, the category of computa-
tions which can be efficiently performed by a “machine”
which would efficiently generate solutions of the relevant
model would be the NP class. As already mentioned,
this is known if the rules are replaced by those of a spin-
glass system (Bachas, 1984; Barahona, 1982). (Which
rules should be expected for future physics theories is
of course completely open—for example, at the dawn of
QM, Heisenberg employed noncommuting-operator rules
while Schroedinger used differential equations.) A fur-
ther simple example is described next.
The example involves a standard NP-complete prob-
lem, such as scheduling M meetings within a finite given
time T . The requirements concerning the length of the
meetings and the intended participants are to be spec-
ified by inputs Im, and the timing of each meeting by
parameters of a different type, Pm. As the problem is
NP, it is known that N steps are required to verify that
the meetings have no conflicts, with N polynomial inM .
It is easy to construct a DAG with N nodes represent-
ing the algorithm for performing this verification process,
3 This O(N) graph is not to be confused with the exponentially
large configuration graph representing all the possibilities for a
model (Arora and Barak, 2009).
4beginning with the Ims and Pms as inputs and resulting
in an output O which is true for a valid combination of
the timings Pm. The directions of the edges of the DAG
lead from its inputs Im and Pm to its output O. Each of
the N steps is associated with a rule Fn, consistent with
the description of the previous section.
Consider now removing the arrows from the graph.
This could represent a model where each rule Fn is re-
placed by a weight Wn, which depends on the same pa-
rameters involved in Fn. Thus, the rules of the model are
local as before, but the model dictates the overall behav-
ior of the combination of parameters {Qn}, and cannot be
easily separated into N consecutive steps. Combining all
of the local rules involves multiplying the weightsWn for
all n, and normalizing the weights to obtain a probabil-
ity distribution involves adding all the product weights,
resulting in a normalizing factor Z =
∑
{Qn}
(
∏
nWn).
(In the statistical mechanics context, Z is called the par-
tition function, and the weights are given by an exponent
involving the potential energy and the temperature.)
Returning to the specific scheduling problem above,
one can define each of the weights Wn as equal to unity
for every combination which is consistent with the rule
Fn, and to zero otherwise. One may further set the in-
puts Im for a specific scheduling task, and set the “out-
put” O to “true.” If the time T is not too short,4 every
valid schedule, i.e., every valid combination of the Pms,
together with the corresponding values of the other Qn
parameters, would have a weight of unity, and all other
combinations would have a vanishing weight (Z repre-
sents the number of valid schedules). The result of such
a model would be to generate at random one of the valid
schedules. This too is, of course, an NP-complete task.
The resulting pattern is similar to that described for
the CHSH inequality in the introduction. The standard
arrow of time is a strong restriction that would limit the
capabilities of any model of a physical system to those
of standard algorithms, in accordance with the strong
form of the Church-Turing Thesis. Quantum systems are
not as limited as that, but removing the arrow-of-time
restriction altogether would result in capabilities which
are “too powerful” according to reasonable expectations.
A restriction is necessary, but it needs to be less powerful
in order to curtail the achievable complexity class from
NP to BQP, not to P.
D. Discussion
The above argumentation may appear to be making a
philosophical point, but the intention is to apply this rea-
4 Dealing with shorter times, or with tasks for which the structure
of the graph and the Fn rules depends not only on the Ims but
also on the Pms, requires more-complicated examples.
soning to guide developments in mathematical physics.
This follows Feynman (1965), who contended that no-
body understands QM. He demonstrated how predictive
power can coexist with a lack of understanding with the
example of the astronomers of the Maya culture, who
possessed a mathematical procedure for predicting the
appearances of the moon—the timing of a new moon or
of an eclipse—which did not involve any conception of
orbital paths. Feynman also suggested that developing
reformulations of existing theories can serve to improve
our understanding, even if no novel predictions are in-
volved (examples include the development of Lagrangean
and Hamiltonian mechanics as alternative formulations
of Newton’s equations; for a long time, these only im-
proved our understanding of classical mechanics; much
later, they also played essential roles in the development
of QM).
In this context, the upshot of the previous sections
is that quantum computation adds to our motivation to
develop reformulations of QM which do not conform to
the standard arrow of time. But it is clear that some
effective arrow of time must be retained. Physical theo-
ries in general, and standard QM in particular, conform
to the Signal-Causality rule—they describe signaling to
the future, but not to the past (there are many aspects
which are time reversal-symmetric, but there is always
something to break the symmetry, often just a special
treatment of initial conditions). Thus, the flow of acces-
sible information, relating to the inputs and the outputs
of the theory, is always from the past to the future.
In standard Schroedinger-picture QM, this past-to-
future flow affects the internal parameters of the the-
ory as well—the quantum state or wavefunction is taken
to evolve from the past to the future (whether or not
collapse is allowed for). A reformulation breaking the
standard-arrow-of-time rules would involve some internal
parameters which depend on other parameters in their
future (possibly a statistical dependence, i.e., having a
probability distribution which depends on future param-
eters). In order for this future-dependence to play an es-
sential role, it must involve relationships which cannot be
simply inverted, such as a dependence on the externally-
controlled settings of future measurement devices. For
this reason, the relevant arrow-of-time condition involves
future input parameters, and is called No Future-Input
Dependence in Wharton and Argaman (2019).
The situation concerning causality or the arrow of
time in reformulations of QM which would violate this
condition is similar to that concerning locality in stan-
dard QM, which violates locality in the sense of Bell’s
Local-Causality condition, but conforms to Signal Lo-
cality. Here the No Future-Input Dependence condition
would be violated for internal parameters, but the out-
put parameters would not have this characteristic—the
Signal Causality condition involving the outputs would
be maintained.
5As noted in the introduction, relaxing No Future-Input
Dependence has dramatic consequences for reformula-
tions of QM. The generalization of Bell’s locality con-
dition to models with Future-Input Dependence is called
Continuous Action, and maintaining this locality condi-
tion has distinct advantages, in addition to the necessary
Signal Locality (Wharton and Argaman, 2019). In fact,
Bell’s Local Causality condition can be seen to follow
from requiring both Continuous Action and No Future-
Input Dependence (assuming Lorentz Covariance and
the use of standard mathematics and probability rules).
Thus, if a reformulation of QM with Continuous Action
can indeed be found, it will accordingly be based on a
model with parameters with Future-Input Dependence.
It would be natural to view these parameters as pro-
viding a more-or-less direct description of reality — ontic
variables — with the standard “quantum state” taken to
merely represent the information available to an external
observer up to a time t. This is the psi-epistemic view
of QM [see, e.g., Caves et al. (2002)]. The arguments
posited against this view in the past would fail in the
presence of Future-Input Dependence. The fact that this
state “evolves” with t in an information-conserving man-
ner (unitarity) would be required by its role as represent-
ing unchanged information, as long as indeed there is no
update of the available information. Similarly, this “state
of knowledge” would have to suddenly change upon such
an update, explaining precisely why and how measure-
ments cause “wavefunction collapse.”
This brief discussion only aims to indicate that the
development of Future-Input Dependent models with
Continuous Action is feasible in principle. For details,
including concrete examples of toy models reproduc-
ing QM in the specific context of Bell’s Theorem, see
Wharton and Argaman (2019). Developing a full refor-
mulation of QM along these lines appears to be chal-
lenging not because of a necessity to deal with a par-
ticularly complicated situation, but primarily because of
the need to overcome the barrier associated with conven-
tional thinking concerning the arrow of time.
E. Conclusion
When we use a mathematical model to describe the
objective properties of a physical system, we generally
expect these properties to depend on the past of the sys-
tem, not on its future. This works well in the classi-
cal, macroscopic domain, but the presence of quantum
fluctuations and uncertainty appear to undermine such
thinking for quantum systems. The time-symmetry of
microscopic physical laws similarly speaks against such
a distinction between the past and the future.5 Allow-
ing the system’s “objective” microscopic parameters to
depend on the specification of the measurement to be
made on the system at a later time, not only on the ear-
lier preparation, may resolve many a quantum mystery.
As described above, the “nonlocality” of Bell’s Theorem
serves as the prime example — quantum phenomena vio-
late the relevant “no-action-at-a-distance” condition only
when this condition is formulated within models with
such a strong past-future distinction.
Generalizing the “no-action-at-a-distance” condition
to models which are time-reversal symmetric, or which
possess a weaker arrow-of-time rule, removes the restric-
tion posed by Bell’s Theorem (Wharton and Argaman,
2019). This could serve to “explain” the power of quan-
tum computation — if indeed microscopic parameters are
not subject to the rules of a DAG, the associated com-
plexity class need not be limited to P.
Once this point of view is accepted, one is faced with a
sharply contrasting problem. It is not that quantum com-
putation is surprisingly powerful — it becomes surprising
that it is not even more powerful. A “physical princi-
ple” must be imposed on the relevant family of models
to limit the capacity from NP to BQP. This is closely
analogous to the search for a limiting physical principle
in the context of Tsirelson’s bound, which is related to
Bell’s Theorem and has been an active field in recent
decades. Perhaps concepts from quantum computation
will provide additional clues or lead to new directions on
this adventure.
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